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Introduction 
Research on policy advice is not new. Since the seventies, scholarly attention has been drawn 
either into the study of specific sets of policy advisory actors (policy workers, policy analysts, 
think tanks) or into the use of scientific and expert knowledge by government bodies. Moreover, 
until recently, policy advice “has been studied more from the philosophical and normative 
positions than from the analytical and empirical perspectives” (Vesely 2013, p. 199). Peters and 
Barker (1993), in an edited volume drawing upon the theoretical and empirical contributions of 
12 different authors, were first to contribute to the understanding of policy advice as information 
flowing in large supply within the contemporary policy advice process, with institutions playing 
a major role in determining its final use. In the mid-nineties, the introduction of the concept of 
policy advisory systems by Halligan (1995), rebalanced scholarly towards the investigation of 
what Craft and Howlett (2013, p. 187) call the “synergistic and interactive effects” of policy 
advice-giving actors within broader policy advisory systems. Beyond actors, of equal importance 
is the policy advisory system as a unit of analysis itself, as well as how advice is organised 
within it and with what results. Vesely (2013, p. 199). How are policy advisory systems 
organised? How are the actors within them configured? Is there convergence or divergence 
across countries and policy domains? What determines actors’ influence and what is the impact 
of such configurations upon policy making? How do policy advisory systems change in time? 
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The examination of past studies reveals that, despite advances, the research agenda on policy 
advisory systems remains open. To begin with, policy advice as a concept remains nebulous in 
contrast to the more specific concept of scientific knowledge and expert evidence. More 
importantly, little is known about the structure and actor configuration of policy advisory 
systems outside Anglo-Saxon countries. Even there, important advisory system actors, such as 
private consultants remain understudied. Furthermore, the reasons why policy advisory systems 
may differ across countries and policy areas have not been thoroughly studied. In addition, the 
determinants of actors’ influence remain an unresolved issue, while the impact of policy advisory 
systems upon policy making remains also understudied. Finally, unlike the developing yet open 
research agenda on policy advisory systems, theoretical and empirical work on use of policy 
advice, what Brans, Van Damme and Gaskell (2010, p. 17) call “policy advice utilization” 
remains less developed, if not embryonic.     
In the present paper we review the literature on policy advice. In particular we focus on what we 
know and what we don’t know on policy advisory systems and policy advice utilisation. We do 
this by employing a traditional narrative review method. In order to add some rigour in the 
review process we organise the material around key themes and questions that emerge as 
important in the literature. This is done in three sections. First, we begin with a discussion on the 
very definition of policy advice. Does policy advice, presently defined as a background concept, 
adequately delimits our field of enquiry or should we better construct a systematised one? In the 
second section we proceed with an examination of what the literature says on policy advisory 
systems. What are policy advisory systems and how may the policy advice process be 
conceptualised within them? More importantly what do past studies reveal on policy advisory 
system configuration and why are they structured the way they do? How do such systems change 
in time and towards what direction? What can be said on the determinants of actors and their 
influence? Finally, the third section deals with policy advice utilisation. We present literature 
insights on three crucial issues: a) how may we conceive use of policy advice, b) who are the 
users of advice and why do they seek advice, c) what determines use of advice?  
 
1. Policy advice:  
1.1. Definition 
According to Halligan (1998, p. 1686) “policy advice in the sense that it is understood today is 
relatively recent”. During the course of the twentieth century, as the policy environment became 
more complicated, decision makers have increasingly become more and more reliant on the 
policy advice function (Halligan 1998, p. 1686). But what is policy advice? How is it actually 
being understood by scholars?  
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Definitions of policy advice abound. Peters and Barker (1993, p. 2) see advice, not as scientific 
fact, but as “informed opinion”, thus breaking away from the tradition of looking into advice as 
“systematic knowledge, structured rationality and organised creativity” (Dror 1971 quoted in 
Peters and Barker 1993, p. 2). Halligan (1998, p.1686) too argues that policy advice must be seen 
as fundamentally “covering analysis of problems and the proposing of solutions”, generally 
referring to the expert opinion offered to a government about a course of action. On a rather 
similar tone, scholars in more recent studies (Brans et al 2010, p. 15, Bossens et al 2013, p. 3, 
Van Damme et al 2011, p. 126) define policy advice as “an opinion or recommendation offered 
as a guide for future policy”.  
According to Peters and Barker (1993, p. 2) modern governments are major consumers of such 
policy advice, while providing advice to governments “has become a very large game which 
almost any number can play”.  Policy advice may be the product of policy analysts, but also of a 
broad range of actors inside and outside government such as scientists, civil servants, political 
appointees, NGOs, think tanks and international organisations. Referring to Jones (1982), Peters 
and Barker (1993, p. 9) argue that the ‘cozy little triangles’ that once dominated policy making 
now have become ‘big, sloppy hexagons’. Halligan (1995) too documents the expansion of 
policy advice supply through his concept of policy advisory system, while Craft and Howlett 
(2012, p. 85) reach the conclusion that even informal advice coming from colleagues, friends and 
relatives may be seen as policy advice. 
But if the decision maker’s friends and relatives provide advice, then it may be argued that the 
there is a high risk of conceptual stretching, concept misinformation and degreeism. Does all 
informed opinion or recommendation offered as a guide to future policy constitute policy 
advice? It may be argued that the above definitions provide us with a background concept, while 
we are in need of a more systematised one. By background concept we mean “a constellation of 
potentially diverse meanings associated with a given concept” (Radaelli 2003, p. 31, Adcock and 
Collier 2001, p. 530). By systematised concept we mean “a specific formulation adopted by a 
particular group of researchers” and one that is “commonly formulated in terms of an explicit 
definition” (Radaelli 2003, p. 31, Adcock and Collier 2001, p. 530). While it is relatively 
straightforward to define policy advice as a background concept, it is much trickier to create a 
systematised one, which would give us the opportunity to properly delimit our field of inquiry. 
Such a systematised concept of policy advice begs for addressing a set of crucial issues. Some of 
them are adequately addressed in the literature, others not.  
1.2 Advice vs scientific knowledge 
What is the relationship of policy advice with data, information, evidence and scientific 
knowledge? Majone (1989, p. 1) reminds us that “as politicians know only too well, but social 
scientists too often forget, public policy is made of language”. Advice in this respect is seen 
neither as objective scientific knowledge, nor as a formal technique of problem solving, but as 
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argumentation and persuasion. Persuasion is needed in order to increase the acceptability of 
advice but also the willingness to act on inconclusive evidence, since “facts and values are so 
intertwined in policy making that factual arguments unaided by persuasion seldom play a 
significant role in public debate” (Majone 1989, p. 6,7,37-41).  
In their work on policy advice and the advice process, Peters and Barker (1993, p. 3) argue that 
there are three dimensions of policy related information: a) content of advice, b) whether advice 
actually exists, c) “extent to which it has already been processed by individuals and organisations 
outside government”. Referring to context they bring home the point that advice is neither just 
facts, nor simply opinions presented in a neatly separated package-form to policy makers. As a 
matter of fact, facts and opinions are so closely intertwined that there is “no escaping the 
influence of opinion on the information that is being presented to government decision makers” 
(Peters and Barker 1993, p. 10). Referring to the actual availability of advice as knowledge to 
governments, they stress the point that there are times when knowable information does not exist 
on an issue, but governments need to create it (Peters and Barker 1993, p. 4-5). Finally, they 
highlight the distinction between raw data and processed data (Peters and Barker 1993, p. 10). 
Policy advice is neither raw data, nor is it only objective scientific knowledge. At the basis of 
policy advice is the conversion of raw data into “information conforming to the categories and 
contexts used within the decision making organisation” (Peters and Barker 1993, p. 10). To put it 
simply, advice is opinion and interpretation intertwined with attempts at creating objective facts. 
Halligan (1998, p. 1686) too highlights the fact that advice is different to simple information, 
since it “adds interpretation and proposals on how to proceed”.  
Brans, Van Damme and Bossens(Brans et al 2010, p. 44, Van Damme et al. 2011, p. 126, 
Bossens et al. 2013, p. 3), bring home the point of Peter and Barker (1993) that policy advice is 
opinion and recommendation, used as a guide for future policy. However, in a comparative study 
on European education councils, commissioned by the European Commission, the above 
mentioned scholars (Brans et al 2010, Van Damme et al 2011, Bossens et al 2013) also bring into 
the picture Lindquist’s (1990, p. 26 – 34) approach to policy relevant knowledge and 
information. According to Lindquist (1990, p. 26-34), policy related knowledge produced by 
scientists and striving for parsimony exists alongside policy relevant information, what he calls 
‘policy inquiry’. The latter may be broken down into “three broad categories of structured 
information”: raw data, research and analysis. It may be argued that while Lindquist (1990) starts 
with a broader understanding of what constitutes policy related information and therefore advice, 
his final typology is rather restrictive.       
1.3 The limits of policy advice: advice vs interaction 
If policy advice does not equal raw data, nor is it equated to the product of scientific research and 
technical policy analysis, then “how can we differentiate advice from other forms of interaction 
on policy (Brans et al 2010, p. 26)”? According to an OECD report (2001, quoted in Brans et al 
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(2013, p. 26) it may be argued that consultation and active participation leads to delivering 
products with the status of advice. But if active participation of that sort is policy advice, then 
what can be said about the claim of Craft and Howlett (2012, p. 85) that even the product of 
informal advice by friends and relatives may be considered policy advice? Would it not be 
appropriate to distinguish between policy advice and general advice?  
1.4 Policy advice and the policy cycle 
Moreover, the question arises whether advice exists outside the policy formulation stage and 
what types of policy advice are there? Halligan (1995, p. 139) makes the distinction between 
advice for policy formulation and advice for implementation, that is “production engineering” 
advice. However, his approach to the subject seems to favour the view that policy advice exists 
primarily at the policy formulation stage (Halligan 1998, p. 19686). But could it not be that even 
a recommendation over a problem that needs to be addressed (agenda setting stage) also be 
considered advice? And what can we say about the products of policy evaluation?  
1.5 Types of policy advice 
Equally important is the distinction among types of advice. What kinds of policy advice are 
there? Halligan (1995, p. 139) makes the distinction among strategic and informational, strategic 
and operational, policy and political advice. Craft and Howlett (2012, p.91) have constructed a 
typology of four types of content of advice: a) pure political and policy process advice, b) 
medium to long term policy steering advice, c) short-term reactive and fire fighting advice, d) 
evidence based policy making. Finally, Tenbensel (2008) argues that there exist three types of 
knowledge relevant for policy making: a) episteme (scientific), b) techne (experiential) and c) 
phronesis (practical value rationality). Upon which exactly type of policy advice must we focus 
our research efforts?    
Conclusion 
Summing up this section on policy advice, it may be argued that the concept remains nebulous. 
Different authors assign different meanings to policy advice. This, however, increases the risk of 
concept misformation, conceptual stretching and degreeism.  As Radaelli (2003, p. 28) has 
argued when dealing with the Europeanisation research agenda, “concepts that are not well 
defined lead to confusion and elusive language ... Concepts without negation are universals, they 
point to everything”. As Sartori (1970, p. 1042) was first to note in the early seventies, such 
concepts are “conceptions without specified termination or boundaries”. In view of this, it may 
be argued that the developing policy advisory system and policy advice utilisation research 
agenda could benefit from a more systematised definition of what constitutes a most central 




2. Policy advisory systems 
2.1 A definition  
Scholarly attention on policy advice has traditionally focused on the study of specific individual 
sets of actors, such as for instance policy workers and analysts. The landmark work on policy 
analysts, done by Meltsner (1975, 1976, 1979) in the seventies first comes to mind. However, as 
Craft and Howlett (2013, p. 187) argue, despite the merits of such studies, they do not address 
the “interactive” and “synergistic” effects of actors as members of a policy advisory system. 
Such policy advisory systems appear to “arise in almost every instance of decision-making” 
(Craft and Howlett 2013, p. 187). Referring to the evolution of the policy analyst’s profession 
since the ‘60s, Radin (2013, p. 18) argues that “by the end of the 20th century, the Machiavellian 
image of the policy analyst as an advisor to the Prince was replaced by an image of an individual 
operating (usually in a public organisation) along with other policy analysts in both public and 
non-public organizations”. Peters and Barker (1993, p. 1) were first to attempt a more complete 
analysis of the policy advice process, perceived as the process “by which governments 
deliberately acquire and passively receive ... advice on decisions and policies which may be 
broadly called informative, objective or technical. However, it was not till the mid-nineties when 
the concept of policy advisory system came to the fore.   
Policy advisory systems were defined by Halligan (1995) as systems “of interlocking actors, with 
a unique configuration in each sector and jurisdiction, who provide information, knowledge and 
recommendations for action to policy makers” (Craft and Howlett 2012, p. 80). Similarly, other 
authors define the policy advisory system as that “set of actors, inside and outside government, 
who provide advice to policymakers, and the informal and formal procedures and mechanisms 
that exist to acquire advice from these actors” (Bossens et al 2013, p. 2). Since 1995 work on 
policy advisory systems has seen an important increase in volume and scope (Halligan 1998, 
Howlett, 2009a, 2009b, Brans et al 2010, Howlett and Wellstead, 2011, Wellstead et al. 2011, 
Craft and Howlett 2012, 2013, Bossens et al 2013, Fobé et al 2013, Howlett and Migone 2013a, 
Howlett and Migone 2013b, Vesely 2013). However, as we shall see below the research agenda 
remains open. Crucial topics such as the conceptualisation of policy advisory systems, the 
structure and configuration of actors within them, advisory system dynamics, influence of actors 
and finally the impact of policy advisory systems upon policy making, are still open to further 
theoretical development and empirical investigation. We proceed with examining where the 
literature stands in relation to those issues.  
2.2 Conceptualising the policy advisory system 
Scholars have proposed several conceptual models of policy advisory systems. It may be argued 
that the existing models fall under three broad categories: a) locational (market analogy, location 
and control), b) content based, c) communication process.  
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 Locational models 
Location based models focus on the location of suppliers of advice into the policy advisory 
system. Several such conceptual models have been proposed.  As Craft and Howlett (2012, p.81) 
inform us, early efforts see the advisory system as a market place for policy ideas (Table 1) with 
demand, supply and a set of brokers to match supply and demand (Lindquist 1998, Maloney et al 
1994, Clark and Jones 1999, March et al 2009). According to Lindquist (1990, p. 29), “positing a 
model of users and producers of knowledge is a common starting point for developing 
arguments” also in the knowledge utilisation literature (Weiss 1977, 1978, 1980, Knot and 
Wildavsky 1980, Bellavita 1981, Bardach 1984, Wittrock 1985). As Peters and Barker (1993, p. 
3) argue “the market analogy of buying and selling seems appropriate, as we can easily think 
about a market for information for government, with many sellers and a number of buyers”. This 
market for policy advice is not monopsonistic. On the contrary, various governmental institutions 
compete for information sources and control over information even on the same subject (Peters 
and Barker 1993, p. 3).  
   
Table 1: Policy advisory system as a market place. Source Craft and Howlett 2012, p. 81-82 
Proximate decision makers Consumers of policy analysis and advice. 
Those with actual authority to make policy 
decisions: cabinets, executives, parliaments, 
congresses, legislatures, senior administrators 
Knowledge producers Academia, statistical agencies and research 
institutes who provide basic scientific data 
upon which analyses are often based 
Knowledge brokers Intermediaries between knowledge generators 
and proximate decision makers packaging data 
and information into usable form (permanent 
specialised research staff, commissions, task 
forces, non-governmental specialists) 
Source Craft and Howlett 2012, p. 81 - 82 
 
Contrary to conceptualising the advisory system as a market place for advice, Halligan (1995, p. 
139) proposes an alternative locational model, based on flows of information and influence. In 
particular, the policy advisory system may be conceptualised as standing upon two fundamental 
dimensions: a) location of advising actors vis à vis the government and b) degree of government 




Table 2: Locational model of the policy advisory system. Source Halligan 1995, p. 141 
 
Much more recently, Howlett and Walker (Howlett, 2011, Howlett & Walker, 2012), in a work 
where they investigate the roles of policy managers as a group of privileged insiders within the 
governmental policy advisory system in Canada, make the distinction between proximate and 
peripheral actors. Accordingly, using the criterion of whether these actors come from the public/ 
governmental sector or the non-governmental sector one, they come up with four types of actors: 
core actors, public sector insiders, private sector insiders and outsiders. Based on the distinction 
between proximate and peripheral actors and bringing also into the picture the dimension of 
government control, Vesely (2013, p. 201) classifies policy advisory systems using “four types 
of loci where policy advice is generated ... based upon two basic dimensions” (Table 3).  In his 
typology policy advisory systems may be proximate internal or peripheral external projecting 
high levels of government control, or peripheral internal or proximate external projecting less so.   
 





 Content based models 
Moving away from the locational (inside/outside of government, control/no control from 
government) approach, Craft and Howlett (2012, 2013) argue that the policy advisory system 
landscape must be seen as a complex web of advice giving actors in the middle of which stand 
the policy makers. In such a network like advisory landscape, policy advice giving activities are 
classified according to content of advice. Craft and Howlett (2011, p. 89-92) organise policy 
advice giving actors (advisers, civil servants, NGOs, think tanks etc) within the policy advisory 
system according to four types of content of advice: a) short-term reactive and procedural, titled 
“pure” political and policy process advice, b) long-term anticipatory and procedural, titled 
medium to long term steering advice, c) short-term substantive, titled short-term crisis fighting 
advice and d) long term/anticipatory and substantive, titled Evidence Based Policy Making (table 
4).  
 
Table 4: Content based policy advisory system. Source Craft and Howlett (2012, p. 91) 
 
 Communication process models 
Finally, inspired by Rich and Oh’s (2000, p. 179) work on information/knowledge utilisation, 
Bossens et al (2013) appear to take a whole different view on the subject. The policy advisory 
process is conceptualised as “a communication process in which we can distinguish between 
sender, receiver, message, channel” (Bossens et al. 2013, p. 3). The senders are the suppliers of 
policy advice and, using a rather locational approach, they are grouped under three categories: a) 
inside government (policy analysts in departments and agencies), b) intermediate in broader 
government (advisory councils) and c) outside of government subdivided into academic 
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(university researchers) and non-academic advisers (trade unions, interest groups, private 
companies etc). Their roles may be formal or informal. Policy advice in turn is conceptualised as 
a message consisting of facts and opinion, which in turn, using Tenbensel’s (2008) typology is 
further classified into three types: a) scientific (episteme), b) experiential (techne) and c) value 
driven (phronesis). The advice provided by the senders may be solicited or unsolicited (Halligan 
1995, p. 140), with advice mechanisms being eitheropen or closed, temporary or permanent and 
advice being given on the basis of either consensus or by considering the minority view (Bosses 
et al 2013, p. 6). The receivers refer to the policy makers, a category which in turn comprises of 
ministers, ministerial advisers, members of the legislature and administrators. Finally, channel 
refers to the way policy advice is transmitted to the policy makers. Using Lindquist’s (1990) 
suggestion, four main ways of communicating advice are discerned: a) direct convocation 
activities, where advising actors discuss advice directly with the user, b) indirect convocation 
activities, where the advice is transmitted indirectly through symposia or workshops, c) direct 
publication activities, like memos and reports disseminated directly to the user, d) indirect 
publication activities, where advice is disseminated in intermediary bodies with the aim of 
influencing policy makers. To those traditional convocation activities one may add social and 
new media as a new and influential channel of communication and potentially a new area of 
theoretical and empirical investigation.  
2.3 Configuration of actors and structure of policy advisory systems 
But what do advisory systems look like? How are policy advisory systems structured? What is 
the dominant configuration of actors within such systems? For Halligan (1995, p. 141), the 
advice system “comprises several types of bureaucratic and political adviser”. At the core of the 
system sits the single advice provider, usually the public servant, who provides advice to a 
specific client, usually the minister or his cabinet. Next to this arrangement there is usually some 
extra form of policy instrument like a task force, an administrative research unit or political 
advisers. The exact nature and role of these different organisational options differ across 
countries (Halligan 1995, p. 140).  
Contrary to this “vertical advice process”, Craft and Howlett (2013, p. 189, 192) argue, in line 
with numerous studies (Bakvis 1997, Radin 2000, Parsons 2004, Hoppe and Jeliazkova 2006, 
Prince 2007, Dobuzinskis, Howlett and Laycock 2007, Maley 2011) that the policy making 
environment today is more fluid, pluralised and polycentric. They conceptualise the policy 
advice landscape as a “complex horizontal web” of policy actors and bodies, at the centre of 
which sit the policy makers. Policy actors stretch beyond the traditional professional 
bureaucracy: political advisers, government research agencies, non-departmental agencies, 
legislatures’ research departments, temporary advisory policy units, ad hoc commissions and 
committees, think tanks, trade unions’ research units, political parties and interest groups study 
units, NGO’s policy analysis units, community organisations and consulting firms, but also 
citizens, even “colleagues, friends and relatives providing less formal or professional forms of 
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advice” (Craft and Howlett 2012, p. 85). Craft and Howlett (2013, p. 192), paint a picture of a 
clear shift from “the largely internal, technical, ‘speaking truth’ policy advising toward the 
diffuse and fragmented ‘sharing of influence’ approach”. This is what Hoppe (1999, p. 201) 
refers to as a shift from ‘from speaking truth to power’ to ‘making sense together’. 
Evidence produced from empirical studies in countries such as the UK, Australia, New Zealand, 
the Netherlands, Canada and Germany suggest that there are important differences in the 
sourcing and configuration of advisory actors and influence in the supply of policy advice in 
different countries (Craft and Howlett 2013, p. 188). The ‘sharing truth with multiple actors’ 
model may not characterise all jurisdictions (Craft and Howlett 2013, p. 192).  
Trying to explain why advice systems vary, Halligan (1995, p.141-142) offers a range of 
explanatory factors: a) the degree to which an advisory system is liable to the preferences 
prevailing within the political system, b) state structure and political system (unitary, federal, 
single party-majoritarian, parliamentary-presidential, multi-party consensual), c) degree of 
openness to external influence, d) the policy domain, e) variations in organisations and interests 
among policy sectors, f) personal styles of leaders. Taking for example preferences prevailing 
within the political system Halligan (1995, p.141) distinguishes between two types of advisory 
systems. On the one hand we find those dominated by public servants. These are policy advisory 
systems within the administrative state tradition. There is, however, a second possibility: to be 
“dominated by politicians, where there is reliance on political appointments and the sharing of 
the spoils of power, particularly under conditions of one party-government” (Halligan 1995, p. 
141). The second version is a politicized system of advice. Moving to the degree of openness, 
Halligan (1995, p. 141) suggests, along the lines of Peters and Barker (1993, p. 11) that there is a 
distinction between a closed and an open policy advisory system, with the latter providing “more 
access points for external interests and a tendency to rely more heavily on a broader and more 
diverse range of contributions”. Finally, advisory system structure and configuration may also 
vary according to whether these systems are formal or informal, institutionalised or not, 
temporary / ad hoc or permanent (Halligan 1995, p. 140, Peters and Barker 1993, p. 11, 
Seymour-Ure 1987). It may be argued that the problem with past studies here is twofold: a) 
explanatory models as to why policy advisory systems vary do exist, but are largely 
underdeveloped, b) empirical work on countries outside the Anglo-Saxon state tradition is 
minimal. 
2.4 Policy advisory system dynamics 
The issue of policy advisory system change has only recently become the focus of increased 
scholarly attention (Craft and Howlett 2013, Vesely 2013). Halligan (1995) did, however, deal 
with the issue of policy advisory system dynamics. Policy advisory systems are seen to be 
experiencing changes on three fronts: a) internal to the public service, b) internal to government, 
c) external to both the public service and government. In the case of the public service Halligan 
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(1995, p. 145 – 148) singles out the following trends: internal reorganisation and the separation 
of policy formulation and implementation, reduction of the policy capacity of departments, 
transformation of the policy adviser into a manager and finally increase of policy evaluation 
activities meaning greater pressure for scrutiny of policy advice. In the case of internal changes 
to government, Halligan (1995, p. 149 – 151) underlines the trend of increased use of political 
advice (political advisers) next to the use of alternative advisory systems such as non-
departmental agencies, the legislature, advisory bodies and expert groups. Finally, in relation to 
advice coming from the external environment Halligan (1995, p. 152 – 158) highlights the 
influence of three distinctive sources of advice: a) NGOs, including lobbies, community groups, 
think tanks, trade unions and other interest groups, b) public consultation with citizens and c) 
international actors: transnational organisations (OECD), international networks and epistemic 
communities. According to Halligan (1995, p. 142, 143) the reason why this change is happening 
is traced to three modes of thinking: a) managerial, promoting the introduction of private sector 
principles and practices into the public sector, b) economic focusing on market, deregulation and 
competition and c) political ideas coming from politicians who directly challenge the strength of 
the civil service. Finally, as we saw above, Halligan (1995, p. 162) brings home the point that 
“while there is considerable convergence among countries, they still retain their own 
preferences”. 
In their very recent work, Craft and Howlett (2013) highlight two specific dimensions of policy 
advisory system change: a) externalisation and b) politicisation. The former relates to a move 
away from internal to government suppliers of policy advice towards a plurality of policy advice 
suppliers outside government. The latter refers to the displacement of non-partisan neutral advice 
with advice that is more partisan-political in nature. Why is this change happening? Does it 
actually happen everywhere? According to Craft and Howlett (2013, p. 190) there are four main 
arguments why externalisation is taking place. On the demand side users of advice demand for 
more political control and responsiveness over the administration, while they also look for 
solutions to ‘wicked’ problems posed by globalisation and which the traditional civil service 
cannot solve. On the supply side public sector reform has eroded the policy capacity of the civil 
service, while the increasing supply of advice from external sources also leads to more 
outsourcing.  
But is the externalisation hypothesis without problems? Vesely (2013, p. 200) argues that despite 
externalisation been a very visible trend in policy advisory system development, its extent differs 
in different countries and different policy domains. As with most research on policy advisory 
systems empirical evidence supporting the externalisation thesis is almost exclusively drawn 
from Canada, the USA, the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Research in France and Sweden 
(Boston, 1994, Saint-Martin, 1998) shows, that “the phenomenon is not as worldwide as 
expected” (Vesely 2013, p. 2000). In addition “the level of externalization also seems to vary in 
different policy domains” (Bakvis, 2000 quoted in Vesely 2013, p. 200). 
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Moving finally to politicisation, and despite the lack of the concept’s specificity Craft and 
Howlett (2013, p. 191) argue that what we see is a “juxtaposition of content and location”. In 
contemporary systems, it is not only civil servants who are pressured to provide advice with 
political considerations, but also political advisers who get increasingly involved in technical 
policy advice giving or coordinating and brokerage functions. The extent of course to which this 
is happening differs again by state administrative tradition, country and sector (Connaughton 
2010a, 2010b, Craft 2013, Eichbaum and Shaw 2007, 2013, Gouglas 2013, Maley 2000, 2013, 
OECD 2011).  
2.5 Policy advisory system impact on policy making 
Research thus far points to the direction that policy advisory systems are changing, though, in 
different ways across countries and policy domains. Whereas the theoretical and empirical 
research agenda on this aspect is developing, it may be argued that there is a lack of theory-
driven, comparative research on the organizational characteristics of policy advisory systems and 
their effects. How do policy advisory systems impact upon policy making? What we know thus 
far is on the range of impacts that different forms of advice might have on decision making. 
According to peters and Barker (1993, p. 16-19) there are four possible information situations 
and consequent impacts upon policy making. In the simplest scenario, adequate information 
leads to a programmed decision. In the worst scenario, when governments feel that there is not a 
basis for information and no effective way of intervening into a policy problem, inspiration 
decisions are the norm. Two other scenarios are possible though. When governments perceive 
advice as offering a solution to a problem, but without advice having adequately established the 
problem’s cause, then they make pragmatic decisions. Finally, when decision makers feel they 
know the root of a problem, but cannot agree on the solution, then they face a situation of a 
bargaining decision. Solutions are chosen through a process of bargaining with alternative 
approaches within the political game (Peters and Barker 1993, p. 16-19).       
In view of the above, it may be argued that having no research on the impact of policy advisory 
system configurations upon policy making is a paradox. According to institutional and 
organizational theory the way an advisory system is structured would be expected to have 
significant implications for the kind of advice that is generated and listened to by governments. 
Consequently it would be expected to have an effect on policy making. Where the literature 
provides us with insights, though, is in relation to factors determining advising actors’ influence.  
2.6 Determinants of actors’ influence 
As we have already seen above, influence is a fundamental dimension behind various policy 
advisory system descriptions and classifications (Halligan 1995, 1998, Craft and Howlett 2012, 
2013). But what determines the influence of a policy actor within the policy advisory system? 
For those scholars conceptualising the advice giving process as a kind of market place for advice 
the source of influence is proximity with decision makers. Policy brokers play here an important 
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role, since as Craft and Howlett (2012, p.82) argue, citing Verschuerre (2009) and Lindvall 
(2009), it is they who possess the “ability to translate distant research results into usable forms of 
knowledge”.  
Halligan (1995, p. 140) takes a different approach to the issue. Influence within policy advisory 
systems varies according to two central dimensions: a) the location of policy advice, that is 
whether advice is internal or external to government, and b) the degree of control the government 
exercises upon sources and actors of advice. In this respect Halligan (1995) argues that it is not 
only location (proximity) vis à vis the proximate decision maker that determines influence, but 
also the degree that governments control actors located either internally or externally. By this he 
refers to the extent that decision makers expect proffered advice to be more or less congruent 
with government aims and ambitions. It has been argued that in the locational model with its 
focus on the control dimension “the broker is not the only game in town ... some actors are more 
susceptible to government control than others and therefore they are more likely to articulate 
advice that decision makers would find more acceptable: that is matching the government’s 
perceptions of best practices, feasibility, and appropriate goals and means for achieving them” 
(Craft and Howlett 2012, p.82-83).  
Finally, not disregarding advancements achieved by earlier locational models of advice, Craft 
and Howlett (2012, 2013) propose content of advice as a crucial substantive determinant of 
actors’ influence within the policy advisory system. “Taken together with locational measures it 
is possible to use this additional dimension to get a better sense not only of which actors are 
likely to influence governments but also about the likely subject of that influence”(Craft and 
Howlett 2012, p. 84). In this respect actors offering pure political and policy process advice 
would have a different role and would be also expected to be influential under different 
circumstances than those offering short term fire fighting advice,  medium to long term policy 
steering advice and evidence based policy making. It may be argued that while our theoretical 
understanding on actors’ influence within policy advisory systems has advanced it is not yet 
complete. Evidently, there is again a wide lack of empirical investigations in non Anglo-Saxon 
countries. More importantly, actors’ influence does not automatically lead to use of advice by 
policy makers. The question thus arises. What determines use of advice within a policy advisory 
system?  
Conclusion 
Summing up this section on policy advisor systems, investigation of past studies reveals that, 
despite significant advances, certain fundamental issues in this fast developing research agenda 
remain open. How are policy advisory systems organised / structured / configured and how do 
they vary across countries or policy domains and why? How does policy advisory system 
configuration impact upon policy making? How do policy advisory systems change through time 
and how? Is there convergence across the board and if not why? In addition, how can we explain 
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influence of policy advisory system actors? The further development of the policy advisory 
system research agenda points towards two directions: a) improve theory, b) extent empirical 
studies to non-Anglo-Saxon countries.  
3. Policy Advice Utilisation 
We have seen above that advice to governments “has become a very large game which almost 
any number can play” (Peters and Barker 1993, p. 3). Moreover, as Halligan (1995, p. 138) 
highlighted and the great majority of scholars agree with, policy advice is also highly contested 
and competitive (Brans et al. 2010, Craft and Howlett 2012, 2013, Bossens et al 2013, p. 2,  Fobé 
et al. 2013). This in turn means that policy makers may receive too much and too much 
conflicting advice (Bossens et al 2013, p. 2). From a rational actor model perspective this is good 
news. Information is essential in allowing individuals to compare alternatives (Rich and Oh 
2000, p. 176). However, contrary to what the rational model perspective assumes, existence of 
great amounts of competing policy advice does not automatically lead to its use. In view of such 
increased policy advice competition the obvious question then becomes what exactly determines 
the use of advice? Given the existence of what Knot and Wildavsky (1980, p. 537) call a 
“crowded policy space” the practical question then arises how can we efficiently organize the 
advice system in order to balance the demand and supply side? Unlike the developing, yet open, 
research agenda on policy advisory systems, it may be argued that research on the use of policy 
advice, what Brans, Van Damme and Gaskell (2010, p. 17, 29, 30) call policy advice utilisation, 
is still at an embryonic stage of development. In the following section we are going to examine 
the literature on three main issues: a) how can we conceptualise the use of policy advice, b) who 
are the users of advice and why do they seek advice, and c) what are the determinants / 
predictors of policy advice utilisation? 
3.1 Conceptualising use of policy advice 
The most frequently applied terms to indicate policy advice use are utilisation/utilization, use, 
influence, impact and uptake, resembling the terminology we usually find in other fields of 
utilisation studies, like research on evaluation use (Jungen 2013, p. 8). To begin with, use and 
utilisation in the literature are used interchangeably. However, two points merit attention. First, 
as some scholars have argued, utilisation may differ from use in that it reflects intended use by 
intended users (Jungen 2013, p. 8). Second, the very term policy advice utilization is only used 
by Brans, Van Damme and Gaskell (2010, p. 17, 29, 30) in a report on education councils across 
Europe. Policy advice utilisation is defined here as the impact of policy advice on innovativeness 
and actual policy (content level results), as well as on social learning, conflict resolution and 
trust (process level results). Content and process level results may be either objective or 
subjective, relating either to actual policy influence or to users’ satisfaction with the received 





Table 5: result areas of policy advice. Brans et al (2010, p. 30) 
 
Not disregarding problems with measuring innovativeness or process results like social learning, 
conflict resolution and trust we would like to focus on the difficulties arising in relation to impact 
on policy. After all impact is an alternative way of looking into the issue of policy advice use. 
How can impact of advice on policy be measured? Conceptualising impact of policy advice, not 
to mention operationalising it, appears to be a demanding task (Bekkers et al 2004). In order to 
face the challenge Brans et al (2013, p. 31) recommend taking into account the insights of past 
studies on information/knowledge utilisation. Following this recommendation there appears to be 
several ways in which we can conceptualise the impact of policy advice.    
The review of the empirical literature on knowledge utilisation by Amara, Ouimet and Landry 
(2004, p. 75-77) reveals that use of research falls under three broad categories: a) instrumental 
use in order to solve clearly predefined problems, b) conceptual use, where research is used in a 
diffuse and indirect way much like in the garbage can decision making model, and c) symbolic 
use in order to confirm the programs users want to promote. Furthermore, in her systematic 
review of the literature on use of policy evaluation Jungen (2013, p. 9) reveals that beyond direct 
/ instrumental, political / symbolic and conceptual / enlightenment use, there are also two other 
potential types of use: a) process use, referring to the effects of participating in an evaluation and 
b) imposed use due to external pressure. Focusing specifically on policy advice Brans et al 
(2010, p.31 ) suggest that utilisation may be seen and measured as having a) an  instrumental 
impact, where use of policy advice equals to a change of behaviour in line with existing 
recommendations, b) a conceptual impact, where advice structures users’ perceptions of social 
reality leading into change of opinion or argumentation, c) an agenda setting impact,   
facilitating the entry of an issue in the public agenda and d) a political-strategic impact, 
facilitating the achievement of one’s goals, through better positioning in relation to competing 
actors.  
A second approach to conceptualising use of policy advice is by using the knowledge utilisation 
ladder. As Lester (1993, p. 274) argues, the benefit of such an approach is that it “incorporates 
both conceptual and instrumental notions of use”. Knot and Wildavsky (1980) have suggested, 
followed by numerous scholars (Lester 1993, Lester and Wilds 1990, Landry et al 2001, Van de 
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Graaf and Hoppe 2006) that knowledge utilisation may be seen as a single step by step utilisation 
ladder. In the first step we find transmission, where advice is communicated to the decision 
maker. The second step entails cognition, where the decision maker must digest and understand 
the input. In the third step, reference is explained as use of inputs in public debate meaning that 
the policy maker’s view of the world has been affected. The fourth step is adoption. This refers 
to the adoption of those parts of advice that agree with existing policy. Finally, the two last 
stages refer to implementation and impact (Knot and Wildavsky’s (1980). Lester (1993) and 
Lester and Wilds (1990), Landry, Amara and Lamari (Landry et al. 2001), Van de Graaf and 
Hoppe (2006), merge these last two steps into a single application stage. During the sixth stage 
of application “utilisation of policy advice is demonstrated in the use of advice in policy 
practice” (Brans et al. 2010, p. 32). In table 6 below we can the way every step of the ladder is 
measured by Landry et al (2001, p. 336) using perceptions of the researcher in relation to 
knowledge utilisation. 
 
Table 6: Stages of Knowledge Utilisation, Source Landry et al (2001), p. 336) 
Despite the policy advice utilisation ladder being of great use in measuring actual impact upon 
policy, not all of its steps are always transparent (Brans et al 2010, p. 32). As a result, researchers 
in the study of education advisory bodies across Europe delimit their definition of impact upon 
policy at only one stage of the single step by step model: the transmission stage. Other scholars 
(Bossens et al 2013) appear to adopt a similar approach. The quantitative knowledge utilisation 
literature provides a solution to this impasse by advancing various comprehensive cumulative 
measures of policy advice use. Past studies point towards two directions. First, much like Lester 
(1993) and Landry et al (2001) have done, one may construct a single index for policy advice 
utilisation based on the six cumulative stages of utilisation, using a multiple item scale. 
Practically speaking, every successive stage would weight more heavily than the previous one, 
with the users of advice being asked to indicate on a scale (i.e. 1 to 5) how accurately each stage 
describes their use of advice. The end result of this statistical exercise, based on survey data, 
would be the construction of use scores per stage, as well as total use scores. They would form 
the dependent variable of a comprehensive model. A second approach may be taken from Oh and 
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Rich’s (1996, p. 17, Rich and Oh 2000, p. 182) construction of their dependent variable 
regarding use of information. In this approach, conceptual, instrumental and symbolic uses of 
policy advice, as well as the single step by step model are deliberately left out. The assumption 
here is that users are unclear about the meaning of various terms (i.e. conceptual vs instrumental, 
stages). Instead, use of information, would be better measured not according to typology or steps, 
but in a general subjective way. This “self-anchored conceptualisation” approach means that use 
of information is measured by asking users whether in the past year they have referred to policy 
related information to help them make decisions about a specific policy area (Rich and Oh 2000, 
p. 182). For their study in mental health policy, utilisation is constructed as a composite variable 
that combines the users’ yes or no answers in relation to different types of information like 
policy analysis, statistical data or program evaluation.  
3.2 Users of advice 
We have seen above that users of advice can be grouped either as proximate decision makers or 
as receivers of advice. In the first category users are the consumers of policy analysis and advice. 
All those with actual authority to make policy decisions: cabinets, executives, parliaments, 
congresses, legislatures, senior administrators. In the latter case they are the policy makers, a 
rather similar category comprising of ministers, ministerial advisers, members of the legislature 
and administrators. Users, though, can be also categorised using alternative criteria. Are they 
intended users or unintended users of policy advice? In addition it has been argued that there is a 
difference between individual use and collective use of advice (Jungen 2013, p. 10). 
But why do decision makers and policy makers seek advice? The literature reveals that decision 
makers seek advice for two main reasons:    
a) To legitimate decisions. Policy makers believe that “receiving advice helps governments to 
appear more open and democratic” (Peters and Barker 1993, p.1). Brans, Vancoppenolle, Van 
Damme and Fobé (Van Damme et al 2011, p. 127, Fobé et al 2013, p. 226) refer to the perceived 
need for “interactiveness”, that is the need of governments to garner “stronger support for 
policies via a closer involvement in the policy process of citizens or stakeholders”. 
b) To improve policy quality. “Governments may accept or seek out advice simply because they 
want to make the right decisions” (Peters and Barker 1993, p. 2).  
In view of this it has been argued that governments want to be seen “willing and accepting 
towards information almost no matter what its origin” (Peters and Barker 1993, p. 2). However, 
whether and how information is used differs depending on certain factors. The question then 




3.2 Determinants of policy advice use 
As the policy advisory system literature revealed, a first approach to the subject would be to 
focus on the issue of actors’ influence within the policy advisory system. Influence here is used 
as synonymous to use. In this case it may be argued that proximity of the advice supplier to the 
decision maker, location inside or outside government, ability of the user to control advice, and 
finally content of advice, are crucial determinants of actors’ influence within the policy advisory 
system (Halligan 1995, Craft and Howlett 2012, 2013). As such they may be considered to 
impact upon the use of policy advice too. Not disregarding the merits of such explanations, it 
may be argued that influence constitutes a separate concept to use. Actors’ influence does not 
automatically lead to use of advice. Moreover, there is arguably more to the actors‘ context than 
proximity to the decision maker or location inside / outside government. Equally, content of 
advice is not the sole defining characteristic of policy advice, while, finally, control does not 
cover the broad range of users’ needs, nor does it equate with the user’s context.  
A second approach to the use of advice is to focus on the characteristics of advice itself. We saw 
beforehand that decision makers seek advice in the form of informed opinion. When this does 
not exist they deliberately solicit it through a ‘knowledge mandate’ (Peters and Barker 1993, 
p.7). For Peters and Barker (1993), the crucial advice characteristic appears to be whether advice 
offers a solution to a problem or a deeper understanding of the problem itself. Is policy advice 
solution generating or is it problem exploring? In the case of the former advice is presented as 
enjoying a greater degree of influence. In the case of the latter its influence is significantly 
diminished (Peters and Barker 1993, p. 18). The characteristics of policy advice come up as 
important explanatory factors of policy advice use in other scholarly work too. Moving beyond 
the problem exploration/solution generation dimension, Bossens et al (2013, p. 7-8) argue that 
use of advice may be explained along four explanatory dimensions: a) kind of advice, especially 
whether the advice is scientific, experiential or value related, using Tenbensel’s (2008) approach, 
b) timing of advice, c) form of advice and d) clarity of insight into a policy problem or solution. 
On a rather similar tone Brans et al (2012, p. 5) argue that policy advice must be relevant to 
policy makers, timely, sufficiently substantiated, feasible and clear. According to a British 
government White Paper (UK Government 1999, p. 9) practitioners appear to ask for advice that 
is forward looking, outward looking, innovative and creative, using evidence, inclusive, joined 
up, while it should also build systematic evaluation of outcomes early into the policy process, as 
well as keep established policy under continuous review. 
 The third approach is more institutional. Peters and Barker (1993, p. 11) argue that an 
inadequate structuring of institutions for policy advice seeking and reception may prevent a 
government from using the available information in the most effective manner. This institutional 
design may vary according to certain criteria: regularity of use of an institution, the institution’s 
orientation towards governmental and non-governmental actors, development of new 
information, openness of information received and formality of the procedure. To begin with, 
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institutions developed for continual use are expected to be more effective in the use of advice 
than ad hoc ones. Furthermore, an institutional design that enables the reception of a broad 
spectrum of information without becoming overloaded will also be more effective. Moreover, 
institutions that are able to generate tailor made research rather than fit previous research to the 
needs of a government would also be more effective in using information. Finally, a formal 
process may also require decision makers to follow up on the advice produced (Peters and 
Barker 1993, p. 11). From an institutional point of view, it may be argued that the policy 
advisory system too, with its very structuration and actor configuration, also determines the final 
use or not of policy advice.  
Users’ needs constitute a fourth approach to explaining the determinants of policy advice 
utilisation. We saw above that users seek advice in order to legitimate decisions and improve the 
quality of policy. This in itself though is not enough to explain use of policy advice.  In his study 
of UK Ministers and advice, Chabal (1993, p. 51) offers evidence that supports the timeliness 
and timing thesis. Ministers, mostly amateurs in departmental portfolios, are in a constant ‘battle 
against time’. Time constraints are not personal, but fundamental built in characteristics of 
executive and legislative power systems. This may lead to political executives using the quickest 
and easiest option. Moreover, Chabal (1993, p. 51) also argues that Ministers may use advice 
depending on whether they want to delay a decision or not decide at all (inaction). It may be 
argued that, while in theory the demand side of the policy advisory system comes up as an 
important predictor of policy advice use, there is a lack of empirical investigations focusing on 
the users, especially political executives. Such a comprehensive way to understanding policy 
advice utilisation from a user perspective would be to employ the insights from either the 
rational action model on information acquisition and knowledge utilisation or the bounded 
rationality one. From a rational model perspective it is argued that individual actors or 
organisations engage in a process of optimising their expected utilities by “selecting through a 
comprehensive analysis the course with the highest pay off” (Rich and Oh 2000, p. 176). In order 
to achieve optimal utility the actors need to gather and analyse alternatives in a systematic way. 
This is the point where information becomes central (Rich and Oh 2000, p. 176). However, 
rational choice models do not explicitly deal with how individuals process information. It is 
rather believed that information acquisition leads directly to utilisation. Rich and Oh (2000, p. 
178-179) summarise the fundamental assumptions of the rational choice model regarding use of 
information: 
 There is perfect information (or amount) of information 
 Users are capable of processing all available information 
 Users search for all available sources of information and apply the findings to problems 
 After acquisition information is automatically disseminated 
 After dissemination information is used 
 Use of information leads to choice among a set of competing alternatives 
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Rich and Oh (2000, p. 177) of course reject the automatic linkage between information 
acquisition and knowledge utilisation and put forward an alternative model driven by bounded 
rationality assumptions. Their focus is on the user side and especially the way organisational and 
political interest considerations lead or not to knowledge utilisation. This demand push model 
focuses on the user as the major factor explaining knowledge utilisation.   
For many scholars, users’ needs are not important in explaining use of policy advice. It is 
contextual factors affecting the user that are more crucial (Van de Graaf and Hoppe 2006). This 
constitutes a fifth approach to explaining use of policy advice. Following Van de Graaf’s and 
Hoppe’s (2006) recommendation, in their report explaining use of policy advice in education 
councils across Europe, Brans et al (2010, p. 18, 19) bring forward an explanation based on 
organisational characteristics of advisory bodies, like legal status and membership, but also 
advisory process characteristics, like timing and policy windows. In particular they put forward 
an empirical model (Table 2) generating 13 variables for the input (7), throughput (3) and output 
phases (3) of the advisory process (Brans et al 2013, p. 48).  
 
Table 7: Empirical model variables: Source: Brans et al (2013) 
     
Moving beyond the knowledge utilisation literature, studies on the use of evidence also provide 
valuable insights which can be used to approach policy advice utilisation. In her review of the 
literature on the use of different types of evidence in policy making, Fobé (2013, p. 227) 
indicates the importance of timeliness and broad societal support for the advice, as well as the 
legacy of the advisory source as important determinants of influence (Rich 1997, Adamo 2002, 
Koontz, 2005, Green et al., 2009). Moreover, aspects such as transparency and facilitation of 
advice production, as well as the very nature of advisory procedures is also thought to increase 
the influence of advice ( Beierle & Cayford, 2002, Beierle, 2000, Edelenbos, Klok, & Van 
Tatenhove 2009, Papadopoulos & Warin, 2007, Rowe & Frewer, 2004, Sterne & Zagon, 1997, 
Van Damme & Brans, 2012, Webler & Tuler, 2000 / interaction literature quoted in Fobé 2013, 
p. 227, 228). 
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Evaluations too may be also considered a type of evidence or simply policy advice. In her 
systematic review of the literature on evaluation use, Jungen (2013, p. 12-18) argues that there 
are different ways to group determinants of evaluation use. Based on a systematic literature 
review by Cousins and Leithwood (1986) twelve predictors of use were grouped in two 
categories: characteristics referring to implementation of evaluation and the policy setting. In 
their categorisation of predictors Court and Young (2006) increase the number of determinants 
while they re-arrange the categories into characteristics of evidence, the political context and the 
link between policy and research communities. James and Jorgensen (2009) organise predictors 
under three categories: information, organisation and the decision maker. Jonshon et al (2009), in 
what has been the second large systematic literature review since the eighties group determinants 
of policy evaluation use into three categories: implementation of evaluations, policy setting and 
stakeholder involvement. Finally, Weyrauch et al (2011) organise predictors around the 
categories of supply, demand and interplay between demand and supply. This is the approach 
also adopted by Jungen (2013). 
It may be argued that, important as the above explanatory factors and approaches may be, they 
form more of a check list of variables, not a comprehensive conceptual framework of policy 
advice utilisation, capable of addressing multiple levels of reality surrounding the policy advice 
utilisation phenomenon. There exist ways by which such comprehensive models can be 
constructed. The way Landry et al (2001) approached the issue in view of social science 
knowledge utilisation in Canada is indicative. Summing up the literature on knowledge 
utilisation, Landry et al (2001, p. 337) explain that all in all there have been put forward 21 
explanatory variables in Sabatier (1978), 110 in Rothman (1980), 15 in Lester (1993) and Lester 
and Wilds (1990) and finally 47 variables in Huberman (1994) and Huberman and Thurler 
(1991). Given the large overlapping between variables, Landry et al (2001, p. 337, 338) organise 
the material around four broad explanatory categories linked to the main theoretical approaches, 
depicted in Table 8, which they use to build a comprehensive explanatory framework for 
knowledge utilisation. In every category we find a set of explanatory variables: a) science push 
variables, coming from the theory that supply of advances in research findings increases demand 
and therefore utilisation, b) demand pull variables, derived from the premise that utilisation is 
explained only by the needs of the user, including the user’s organisational or political interests, 
c) dissemination variables, where utilisation is dependent upon research type and dissemination 
effort, d) interaction variables, where utilisation is explained by the “two-communities 
metaphor” as well as the presence or lack thereof of sustained interaction between researchers 
and policy makers. Based on this, Landry et al (2001, p. 338, 341) put forward 11 explanatory 
variables organised under five categories: types of products, researchers’ context, users’ context, 






Table 8: Determinants of knowledge utilization schools. Source: Belkhodja et al 2007, p. 382 
 
 
Using this explanatory framework as our guide and drawing insights from what literature there is 
on the topic, it may be argued that we could develop such a comprehensive model, this time for 
policy advice utilisation. The model would comprise of five explanatory categories: a) policy 
advice characteristics (indicative variables: type, content, amount, source), b) adviser’s 
characteristics (indicative variables: proximity/location, policy making role, numbers), c) user’s 
context (indicative variables: needs, time, styles of decision making, control, attitude to advice), 
dissemination activities ( timing, channel, advice products), d) interactions among advisers and 
users (indicative variables: direct, formal, participation), e) environmental parameters (indicative 
variables: type of policy advisory system, policy domain). As argued by Oh (1997, p. 6) in the 
case of information utilisation, policy advice too may be regarded as “a complex phenomenon 
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involving environmental, organisational, and attitudinal components as well as the specific 
characteristics of information”.      
Conclusion 
To conclude, it may be argued that policy advice utilisation, both in terms of theory and 
empirical investigation, in comparison to the policy advisory system literature where many 
issues are unresolved but the agenda is developing, is still slowly developing if it is not still 
positioned at an embryonic stage of development. While significant insights can be drawn from 
the knowledge utilisation literature, as well as the evidence and evaluation use literatures, studies 
focusing explicitly on policy advice lag behind. This very reality points research towards the 
following directions: a) refinement of the concept of policy advice use, b) construction of a 
comprehensive conceptual framework that identifies the various explanatory factors and their 
properties, examines how they are linked and finally systematically integrates them, c) empirical 
investigation in policy advisory systems.  
 
Concluding remarks: leads for further research 
 
In the present paper we used a traditional narrative approach to review the literature on policy 
advice, focusing particularly on policy advisory systems and policy advice utilisation. This bird’s 
eye view on the literature revealed that research on policy advice is not new. Since the seventies 
scholarly attention has focused on individual advice giving actors like policy workers and 
analysts. In the nineties Peters and Barker (1993) attempted to throw light to what has since then 
been an understudied angle of policy making: policy advice per se and the policy advice process. 
However, it was the concept of policy advisory systems, developed by Halligan (1995) in the 
mid-nineties, that opened new paths in policy advice research, shifting attention away from the 
examination of specific individual sets of actors and more towards the study of the “interactive” 
and “synergistic” effects of advising actors as members of a specific advisory system. After a 
few decades of research, though, the research agenda is still open. From a substantive 
perspective, crucial issues remain unresolved.   
 
 Policy advice is a nebulous concept that needs further systematisation.  
 Little is known of policy advisory systems’ structures and configuration of actors in the 
present time in non Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 Even fewer things are known about the non-governmental components of policy advisory 
systems in most countries.  
 In addition, important conceptual issues, such as the various sources and patterns of 
influence among advisory actors are still unresolved (Craft and Howlett 2012).  
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 More importantly, despite the existence of empirical studies showing considerable 
variation of advisory systems across countries and policy domains, there is a lack of 
theory-driven, comparative research on the organizational characteristics of policy 
advisory systems and its effects. This is however a paradox. According to organisational 
and institutional theory one would expect the policy advisory system to affect policy 
making and therefore one would expect to find more research on that field. 
 
Finally, contrary to the open yet undeveloped to the full policy advisory system research agenda, 
research on the use of policy advice, what Brans, Van Damme and Gaskell (2013) termed policy 
advice utilisation, remains much less developed if not embryonic. While there is a plethora of 
studies on knowledge utilisation, the science-policy interface and the impact of evidence on 
policy, from which we can gain useful insights, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical 
studies on the use of policy advice per se and its determinants. The question though is pressing. 
From the point of view of policy science there is a fundamental gap in understanding use of 
policy advice from decision makers sitting at the centre of a horizontal web of interlocking 
advisory institutions and actors. From a practical point view decision makers are faced with an 
ever increasing amount of conflicting advice. How can this be better matched? The question 
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